Three years after U.S. President Donald Trump allowed Turkey to invade and occupy the northeastern Syrian cities of Serekaniye and Tal Abyad, the partnership between the United States and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has largely recovered. But the 2019 invasion has had lasting impacts that continue to shake the relationship and destabilize the region—and U.S. policy has not yet fully corrected course.

How did the US-SDF partnership begin?

As the black flags of ISIS were raised around the Kurdish enclave of Kobani in 2014 and the terror group was poised to take control of the city, intense talks were happening across the world. In Washington, American officials followed developments on the ground in Syria and pondered how to face their newly invigorated enemy.

Before the siege of Kobani, world leaders sharply condemned Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, saying that he lacked legitimacy after his violent repression of protests and subsequent military campaigns against the Syrian people. U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration decided to support the Free Syrian Army (FSA) against Assad with a train-and-equip program. FSA groups that participated in this program then sold weapons to, and even joined, Jabhat al-Nusra—a group that was widely considered to be the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda and that is designated as a terrorist organization itself. Thus, American aid that would have gone to fighting Assad and replacing his regime with a moderate government was ineffective at best.

This experience prompted the U.S. to think twice before supporting any other party in the Syrian conflict. But the rise of ISIS and its control of strategic cities like Raqqa and Mosul—as well as the terror group’s genocide of Yazidis in Sinjar in August 2014— prompted the United States to support Syrian Kurdish fighters known as the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) as they fought to defend Kobani. The YPG and YPJ had held out longer than expected in Kobane, and the U.S. was aware of their capabilities from their role in rescuing Yezidis from Sinjar.

Reports coming to the White House painted a grim picture of the situation, and international fear of ISIS grew. But with American support, Kurdish forces were able to liberate Kobane and put ISIS on the defensive. This marked the start of the US-Kurdish alliance in Syria.

The YPG and YPJ continued to fight ISIS region by region, eventually ousting the group from al-Hol, Shaddadi, Manbij, Raqqa, large areas of the countryside of Deir Ez-Zor, and the Syrian-Iraqi border. Along the way, they formally united with allied local Arab and Syriac factions, establishing the SDF in 2015. U.S. assistance, which began in the form of air support only in Kobani, gradually evolved to include on-the-ground military support, training, intelligence cooperation, the establishment of military airstrips and bases, and American forces fighting shoulder to shoulder with SDF fighters. In Baghouz in March 2019, the SDF and the U.S.-led Global Coalition officially achieved the territorial defeat of ISIS.

Obstacles to the Alliance

From the beginning, the U.S. partnership with the SDF faced serious opposition from Turkey—which considers the YPG and SDF to be terrorist organizations indistinguishable from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Turkey spent years calling on the U.S. to end its support for the SDF and proposing plans under which Turkey and Turkish-backed forces would lead operations to liberate cities like Manbij and Raqqa.

However, the U.S. backed the SDF on the grounds that they were the most effective force for the mission. For a period of time, Turkey was not able to intervene against the SDF and the Autonomous Administration.

Soon, however, prospects for an enduring partnership began to deteriorate as Washington heeded Ankara’s demands.

The US-SDF partnership faced its first major setback in 2018, when Turkey began a military operation against the SDF and AANES in Afrin, a Kurdish region in the far northwest corner of Syria. The U.S.-led Coalition had no presence in Afrin due to an undeclared agreement between the U.S. and Russia:  areas east of the Euphrates River were designated as the American sphere of influence, while areas west of the Euphrates were under the auspices of Russia. As a result, Syrian Kurds remained alone in the face of the Turkish invasion.

While the U.S. issued some weak condemnatory statements, asking Turkish forces to show restraint, American officials stated that Afrin was outside of their area of influence and that there was nothing the U.S. was willing or able do to stop the attack. After 58 days of resistance, the SDF and YPG were forced to withdraw from Afrin. The invasion displaced around 300,000 Kurds. Pervasive human rights violations committed by Turkey-backed rebel groups, from theft and assault to rape, kidnapping, and murder, continue in the occupied areas until today.

The most significant blow to the US-Kurdish alliance occurred in October 2019. The Trump Administration gave Erdogan a green light to invade Syria after assuring the SDF that, if they removed their defensive fortifications and withdrew from the Syrian-Turkish border, an invasion would not happen. As a result of the Trump-Erdogan deal and the subsequent U.S. military withdrawal, Turkey was able to invade and occupy Sere Kaniye and Tal Abyad, forcing the SDF to make a hasty ceasefire agreement with Russia and the Syrian regime.

The Kurds viewed the American position as a betrayal, particularly after the loss of more than 11,000 SDF fighters in the joint war against ISIS. Just as in Afrin, Kurds were left alone to face the destructive power of Turkish airstrikes. 250,000 of Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad’s inhabitants were displaced. Like in Afrin, egregious human rights violations continue in these areas today.

However, unlike in Afrin, the United States had a direct hand in events. The problem was not only a failed response, but specific U.S. policy choices that led to a preventable tragedy for the people of northeastern Syria and harmed the gains of the counter-ISIS fight.

A post-Trump reset?

Many Syrian Kurds hoped that the arrival of U.S. President Joe Biden to the White House would undo some of the damage done by Trump. However, the problems caused by the October 2019 invasion still persist—and the U.S. response has been relatively weak.

Turkish drones continue to hunt down and target SDF commanders who led in the fight against ISIS—as well as many innocent civilians, whom Ankara considers legitimate targets simply because of the fact that they live in northeastern Syria.

On July 24, a Turkish drone killed Jiyan Afrin, the commander of the Anti-Terror Units (YAT) of the SDF, along with two of her female comrades. YAT is the main force carrying out raids against ISIS hideouts today and leads the fight against the terror group’s sleeper cells. In the wake of the strike, SDF Commander-in-Chief Mazloum Abdi demanded that the SDF’s “partners must make greater efforts to stop violations,” addressing both Washington and Moscow.

While CENTCOM offered condolences to the families of the victims, their tweet not only failed to name the perpetrator, but misspelled the name of the commander who was killed. Meanwhile, Turkish drones continue to violate northeastern Syria’s airspace, targeting SDF personnel and civilians, including children.

Despite drone strikes and constant Turkish ceasefire violations, the SDF continues to carry out its duty of combating terror cells. On August 25, the SDF launched a security operation in al-Hol camp with the support of the Global Coalition. As the operation drew to a close on September 17, the SDF announced that they had arrested dozens of ISIS sleeper agents, destroyed several tunnels and bunkers, and confiscated a number of weapons.

During the period of the operation, while the U.S. was assisting SDF forces in al-Hol, Turkey did not escalate significantly in the region. However, as soon as the operation ended, Turkish artillery once again targeted northern Syria—and was met with silence from the Coalition. Just a day after the end of the operation, the SDF announced the deaths of three fighters who were targeted by a Turkish drone in Ain Issa. The Coalition said nothing.

These developments send a clear message from Washington to the SDF: “We are with you against ISIS, but we do not want to stir up problems with Turkey.” Three years after Trump’s phone call to Erdogan and the subsequent invasion, the U.S. once again supports its Kurdish allies—but seemingly only in areas far from the from the Turkish border, well past the 30-kilometer strip where most Syrian Kurds live and which Ankara has designated as a proposed “safe zone.”

The ultimate fate of the U.S.-SDF partnership in Syria cannot be predicted in the absence of an American strategy for Syria and Kurdish issues in particular and for the Middle East in general. What can be predicted, though, is that Washington’s abandonment of its Kurdish allies in Syria and Iraq will greatly affect the stability of the region, which could lead to a resurgence of ISIS. Further invasions and occupations by Turkey will lead to more waves of displacement and the same dire conditions that regions currently under Turkish occupation are witnessing today.