Escalation returned to northeast Syria in early August 2024 as tribal elements linked to Iran and the Syrian government launched a large-scale attack across the Euphrates River, targeting the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Deir Ezzor and approaching a nearby U.S. base.

A few days of intense clashes caused civilian casualties, displacement, and heightened tension between the SDF and Damascus before the SDF regained control. However, smaller attacks continue on a near-daily basis in the region, with Tehran and Damascus targeting SDF areas and Coalition bases as conflict escalates in Lebanon and Gaza.

Despite limited changes to the status quo, the events showed how and why Iran and Damascus are supporting and pressuring tribal elements against the U.S. and SDF in the oil-rich zone amidst broader regional tension.

What’s the story?

Last summer, the SDF dismissed the commander of the Deir Ezzor Military Council, Ahmad Al-Khabil (also known as Abu Khawlah), over connections with external parties, drug smuggling, and violations against locals, according to official SDF statements. Abu Khawlah’s close military circle, mostly members of his family and clan, reacted immediately, attacking SDF checkpoints and taking hostages. In turn, the SDF began a security operation to control the situation and prevent further expansion of violence. Another prominent figure, Ibrahim al-Hifl, took the opportunity to announce the formation of a “tribal army” and launch a revolt against SDF control in Deir Ezzor.

Ibrahim al-Hifl and Abu Khawlah had tense personal relations and a history of conflict stemming from power conflicts within the Agaidat tribe as well as eyes on local oil revenues. In 2022, Al-Khabil announced himself as Emir of the Alzubayed tribe and challenged al-Hifl to publicly state his position towards the Damascus regime, something he had avoided doing since 2011. This raised skepticism and distrust among many members of his tribe and among other clans, which predominantly oppose Assad.

Following a week of clashes, the SDF managed to take control of the region and expel hostile groups, including Ibrahim al-Hifl, to the southern bank of the river, which is controlled by Damascus with the support of Iran. Other clans, such as Bagara in the western area and Shu’tat in the eastern rural areas, refrained from joining the armed revolt against the SDF. Conflict was concentrated in al-Hifl’s middle zone and al-Khabil’s northern zone.

During this year’s attacks, regime artillery indiscriminately struck SDF-held towns, leaving 11 civilians dead and other 5 injured in SDF-held al-Dahlah village. Hashem Al-Sattam, who leads the “Lions of Agaidat” battalion, appeared in propaganda footage shared by regime elements managing the battle and transferring armed groups across the river. Al-Sattam is a regime-affiliated National Defense Forces (NDF) commander who has stood beside Damascus since 2011.

Iranian Connection

Iran-linked militias have controlled the southern bank of Deir Ez-Zor since 2017 to preserve the Syrian government’s power and maintain Iran’s land route across Syria. Now, they have found a golden opportunity to put pressure on the SDF and the United States from their position there by utilizing Arab tribes. Al-Hifl began traveling between Deir Ez-Zour and Damascus and reportedly received promises of continued support from Damascus and Iran to push the SDF and the United States from the region. Last February, a report from the Office of the Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve confirmed that the so-called “Tribal Army” receives explicit support from Iran.

The Turkish Front

In conjunction with the escalation in Deir Ez-Zor, Turkey-backed SNA factions escalated on their fronts near Manbij and Aleppo. The SDF-linked Manbij Military Council reported several infiltration attempts against their positions coinciding with the August attacks.

Turkey’s objectives of undermining the SDF and putting pressure on the U.S. presence in northeast Syria appear to align with those of Damascus and Iran. Turkey has little issue with the Assad regime recapturing SDF-held territories. Its government is currently engaged in Russian-backed normalization efforts with Damascus that prioritize joint efforts against the SDF.

News about two meetings between Turkish and Syrian intelligence services recently circulated in the media. The latest statements out of Astana meetings between Iran, Russia, Turkey illustrate  alignment on degrading the SDF and the Democratic Autonomous Administration project.

American Silence

The United States and the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh have surprisingly remained silent about recent developments in Deir Ez-Zor. They did not comment on the fact that their counter-ISIS partners have come under attack from Iran-linked groups. However, a few unconfirmed reports suggested that U.S. jets may have targeted boats transferring armed elements across the river. Meanwhile, the U.S. continues its force protection measures in the region amid heightened regional tensions over the Gaza war.

Northeast Syria is likely to represent another front in the present escalation across the Middle East. U.S. policymakers should be fully aware of the situation there. Further efforts are likely needed to reinforce the military and administrative position of the SDF and DAANES in Deir Ez-Zor to address current challenges and repercussions that fuel resentment, undermine security, and provide ideal circumstances for ISIS recovery.

The U.S. and its allies can contribute to building stability in the region both militarily and in terms of essential services. The Coalition can help by training local allies on ensuring accountability and effectively handling suspects in counter-ISIS and other operations. It can also assist the SDF in strengthening their defenses and response strategies to prevent future attacks.

The U.S. can support frontline operations with advanced surveillance equipment and durable fortifications that would be difficult for adversaries to breach. This would bolster the region’s ability to withstand threats from the Damascus-controlled bank of the river and maintain security.

Beyond military aid, Washington could invest in local communities by promoting agriculture and small businesses. These initiatives would provide economic alternatives, reducing the likelihood that low-income populations would turn to groups like Iran-backed militias or ISIS.

(Photo: U.S. Army Photo /  Sgt. Matthew Crane)