This analysis is a product of the Kurdish Peace Institute in Qamishlo, which provides decision-makers and the public with locally-rooted, actionable information on critical issues facing northeast Syria, the region, and the world.

“There is nothing preventing the return of our relations as before.” This is the latest statement of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan regarding his country’s relationship with the Syrian government and its president, Bashar al-Assad. Almost a decade ago, Erdogan described Assad as a “terrorist” who must pay the price for murdering thousands of Syrians.

Damascus, in turn, has repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of Turkish forces from sovereign Syrian territory as a concrete prerequisite for genuine talks with Ankara. However, this may have recently softened to “a public commitment for withdrawal.” Russian pressure could have played a role in that change.

This new development reveals a stark shift in official Turkish rhetoric toward Assad that could bring about unprecedented developments for the Syrian conflict — in particular for the Turkey-backed Syrian opposition and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Turkey-Syria normalization efforts are not new. In 2022, military and intelligence officials from both countries met in Moscow to coordinate on security matters facing both countries. However, little progress has been made since then.

Turkey has two priorities in dialogue with Damascus. The first is a collective fight against the SDF and its affiliated civilian government, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES). The second is the resettlement of the millions of Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey.

Turkey vs. SDF

While Turkey seeks cooperation with Assad against the SDF, Assad wants Turkey-backed opposition groups, mainly the Syrian National Army (SNA) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in northwestern Syria, to be part of the deal. Both sides appear to be exchanging indirect messages in this regard. Assad has fought the SDF through some of the tribal elements it supports in Arab-majority areas of northeastern Syria, such as elements linked to Nawaf al-Bashir and Ibrahim al-Hifl in the Deir Ez-Zor region that receive direct support from Damascus and Iran-backed armed groups. Ankara, which has blocked opposition factions from attacking Assad’s forces since 2016, has turned the so-called ‘safe zones’ that it occupies in concert with these factions into a fragile area in which internal fighting, poor services, and bad governance are prominent.

The current U.S. administration has not given Erdogan permission for a new ground operation in northeast Syria. However, it has turned a blind eye to intermittent aerial attacks against DAANES, SDF and ISF-linked personnel and infrastructure facilities in DAANES territory. Since 2022, Turkey has been targeting vital infrastructure facilities in the region to undermine DAANES capabilities and turn local communities against them. Ankara has also sought support from other actors such as Russia, Damascus, and Baghdad for support in its war against Kurdish-led regions in Syria and Iraq.

Additionally, Turkey has long tried to tame and co-opt Syrian opposition factions and dismantle or sideline those it cannot. It has weakened groups calling for anti-Assad military operations and given power to those loyal to Turkey’s interests, particularly Turkmen-led groups like the Hamza Division, the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade, and the Sultan Murad Division. It also led the SIG through the Turkmen Association and deployed Turkish employees linked to Turkish governors into governance institutions inside Syria.

Syrians in opposition-held areas are beginning to oppose Turkish atrocities, with some viewing the region as a Turkish protectorate in which Syrians have little say. Those who call for reforms or revolutionary actions are punished or silenced. Turkish authorities recently started a punitive campaign against protestors who targeted Turkish interests and symbols in northwest Syria following Erdogan’s normalization remarks. They pressured the opposition-backed Syrian Islamic Council to withdraw its statement of condolences for  persons killed by Turkish soldiers during violent protests. Turkish forces and affiliated Turkmen factions arrested many Syrians who attacked the Turkish flag and positions in Syria, although no prohibition on disrespecting Turkish national symbols or officials exists in Syrian law. Some arrestees were illegally transferred to Turkish prisons. Internet services supplied from Turkey to Syrian territories under its control were also completely cut off during the protests.

Turkey recently opened a new trade crossing between Al-Bab and Assad-held Aleppo in an attempt to revive the economy and transit routes between Turkey and Syria, ignoring voices rejecting the move and warning that it would strengthen an internationally sanctioned regime.

Syrian Refugees

Around four million Syrian refugees are currently living in Turkey. The refugee card has been long used by Turkish officials against the European Union, in exchange for financial support, and against various regional and global powers in pursuit of Turkish ambitions in Syria.

Syrian refugees are also instrumentalized internally by Turkish political entities. Erdogan used this issue during his local election campaign, repeatedly promising political parties and the Turkish public that he would deport Syrians back to their country.

Conditions for Syrians in Turkish-occupied Syria are already dire and, with normalization, are only likely to deteriorate. Syrians are illegally and forcibly deported from Turkey to Turkish-occupied Syria on a daily basis. . Many observers now see the Turkey-occupied Syrian territories as “dumping zones” for refugees rather than the “safe zones” that Turkish authorities claim to have created.

The refugee issue is closely related to Turkey’s military ambitions. In September 2019, just two weeks before Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring against the SDF, the Turkish president spoke before the U.N. General Assembly holding a map of Syria with a line drawn along the M4 highway.  He stated that Turkey would establish a “safe zone” in this region and resettle millions of refugees there once the territory was “cleared” from US-backed SDF. With funding from states like Qatar, settlements for these refugees have already been opened. Many more are expected in the future.

Turkey’s strategy of demographic change benefits Erdogan and Assad alike. Ankara seeks to remove Syrian Kurdish communities from areas bordering Turkish territory. Damascus is pleased that millions of displaced Sunni Arabs will not return to their home communities that have returned to regime control. Assad and Iran-backed militias have long sought the expulsion of these communities from areas they recaptured from opposition factions.

Several challenges to normalization still remain, and any process will take a long time. However, current developments have the potential to significantly weaken both of Syria’s anti-Assad camps: the Turkey-backed opposition in northwest Syria and the SDF in northeast Syria. An emboldened Assad would undermine the international community’s efforts to revive a genuine political process and any progress toward UNSCR 2254. As a result, the Astana dialogue led by Russia, Iran, Turkey since late 2016 would prove to be the only way forward for an end to the Syrian conflict. After over a decade of civil war, this could reimpose the conditions that first sparked violence.

(Photo: William John Gauthier, CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons)